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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Terence Pak Sing Tsui appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.  Tsui claims the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Tsui with possession of methamphetamine, possession 
of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp.8-9, 16-17, 22-23.)  Tsui 
filed a motion to suppress, claiming he was illegally searched.  (R., pp.41-45.)  
The court held a hearing after which it denied Tsui’s suppression motion.  (See 
generally Supp. Hrg. Tr.)  Tsui thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to 
possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the court’s denial 
of his motion to suppress, and the state agreed to dismiss the two misdemeanor 
charges.  (R., pp.69-77; see generally 11/12/2015 Tr.)  The court imposed a 
unified five-year sentence, with one year fixed, but suspended the sentence and 
placed Tsui on probation.  (R., pp.88-90.)  Tsui filed a timely notice of appeal.  









 Tsui states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Tsui’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)   
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 







Tsui Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
 Tsui contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-13.)  Specifically, Tsui asserts the district court erred in 
concluding the frisk of Tsui was legally justified and in concluding that the 
discovery of marijuana that led to Tsui’s arrest (and later discovery of 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia) was not the result of the frisk. (Appellant’s  
Brief, pp.5-13.)  Tsui’s claims fail.  The district court correctly concluded that Tsui 
was not entitled to suppression based on an allegedly unlawful pat search since 
the discovery of contraband was not the result of the frisk.  Alternatively, Tsui has 
failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion that the frisk was lawful.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).  The power to assess 
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.  State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 




C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying 
 Tsui’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 “There is no reasonable expectation of privacy from lawfully positioned 
agents with inquisitive nostrils.”  State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 273, 846 P.2d 
918, 924 (Ct. App. 1992) (quotations and citations omitted).  Thus, “no search in 
the Fourth Amendment sense occurs when an officer, lawfully present at a 
certain place, detects odors emanating from a private premises.”  Id. at 272-273, 
846 P.2d at 923-924.   
 Officer Martinez encountered Tsui when he and another parole officer 
were performing a parole check at Robert Dickson’s residence.  (See Supp. Hrg. 
Tr., p.7, L.3 – p.10, L.20.)  As Officer Martinez “got close” to Tsui, he could smell 
a “pretty strong” odor of marijuana.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.25, Ls.8-14.)  Officer 
Martinez further explained that as he was “pat searching [Tsui’s] torso and as 
[he] moved down his torso, [he] could smell marijuana pretty strong.”  (Supp. Hrg. 
Tr., p.25, Ls.18-20.)  Officer Martinez asked Tsui “if he had marijuana on him,” 
and Tsui answered, “Yes.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.25, L.25 – p.26, L.1.)  Officer 
Martinez then asked Tsui “if he would show it to [him] and [Tsui] retrieved the bag 
out of his pocket.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.26, Ls.2-4.)  Based on this evidence, the 
district court concluded the marijuana in Tsui’s pocket was not discovered “from 
the pat search,” but was the result of what Officer Martinez could smell followed 
by Tsui’s consensual act of giving Officer Martinez the marijuana.  (Supp. Hrg. 
Tr., p.34, L.3 – p.35, L.1.)  The district court further found the methamphetamine 
was lawfully discovered pursuant to a search incident to arrest.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
p.35, Ls.3-7.)         
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   On appeal, Tsui claims the district court’s conclusion was incorrect 
because, he argues, the state did not meet its burden of proving Officer Martinez 
would have inevitably discovered the marijuana without the frisk, which Tsui 
contends was unlawful.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12.)  Tsui’s claim fails legally 
and factually.   
“The inevitable discovery doctrine applies when a preponderance of the 
evidence demonstrates that the information would have inevitably been 
discovered by lawful methods.”  State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915, 136 P.3d 
379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted).  The inevitable discovery doctrine 
has no application in this case because the marijuana in Tsui’s possession was 
discovered by a lawful method in the first instance, i.e., pursuant to plain smell 
and Tsui’s consensual act of giving Officer Martinez the marijuana,1 and the 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia in Tsui’s possession was lawfully 
discovered pursuant to a search incident to arrest.  State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 
835, 838, 103 P.3d 448, 451 (2004) (citations omitted) (“Searches incident to 
arrest are one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement.”).  
Thus, contrary to Tsui’s assertion on appeal, this Court need not consider the 
inevitable discovery doctrine. 
 Tsui’s factual assertion that Officer Martinez did not or could not smell the 
marijuana on Tsui but for the frisk is unwarranted.  Officer Martinez initially 
explained that, as he got close to Tsui, he detected a “pretty strong” smell of 
                                                 
1 Tsui has not claimed below or on appeal that his act of giving Officer Martinez 
his marijuana was not consensual; he only claims that it was discovered as the 
result of an illegal pat search.  (See R. pp.41-45; Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.15, L.5 – p.16, 
L.11, p.17, Ls.16-23, p.29, L.22 – p.30, L.6; Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-13.)  
 
6 
marijuana.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.25, Ls.10-14.)  Officer Martinez’s discussion of that 
odor relative to Tsui’s torso was in response to a specific question about the 
“sequence” of the smell in relation to the pat search.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.25, 
Ls.15-20.)  That elaboration does not negate Officer Martinez’s initial indication 
that he could smell the odor of marijuana as he got close to Tsui.  Even if Officer 
Martinez would not have smelled the marijuana without frisking Tsui, Tsui has 
failed to show error in the district court’s determination that the frisk was valid. 
 Under the Fourth Amendment, it is constitutionally permissible for “an 
officer to conduct a limited self-protective pat down search of a detainee in order 
to remove any weapons.”  State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660, 152 P.3d 16, 21 
(2007) (citing State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301 (2000)).  
Such searches are “evaluated in light of the facts known to the officers on the 
scene and the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality 
of the circumstances.”  Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations 
and citation omitted).  The ultimate inquiry is an objective one, which requires the 
court to consider whether the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”  Id. 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).  “Several factors influence 
whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a 
particular person was armed and dangerous.”  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 
819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009).  The factors include whether:  (1) “there were 
any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a weapon”; (2) “the 
encounter took place at night or in a high crime area”; (3) “the individual made 
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threatening or furtive movements”; (4) “the individual indicated that he or she 
possessed a weapon”; (5) “the individual appeared to be under the influence of 
alcohol or illegal drugs”; (6) the individual “was unwilling to cooperate”; and (7) 
the individual “had a reputation for dangerousness.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
“Whether any of these circumstances, taken together or by themselves, are 
enough to justify a [pat] frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances.”  Id.    
 With respect to the circumstances surrounding the frisk of Tsui, the district 
court found that “around 11:00 p.m. parole officers Pino and Eli Martinez visited 
the residence of parolee, Mr. Dickson, who at the time was under felony 
supervision.  [Tsui] was present at the residence at the time of the probation 
officers’ visit.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.30, Ls.8-13.)  When the parole officers entered 
the residence, Dickson was upstairs with Tsui.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, Ls.7-20.)  
Dickson came downstairs first and Officer Martinez asked him if anyone else was 
upstairs; Dickson indicated “he had a friend up there.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, 
Ls.7-16.)  “[A] short time later, [Tsui] started coming down the stairs,” with his 
hands in his sweatshirt pocket.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, Ls.19-20, p.24, Ls.14-17.)  
Officer Martinez asked Tsui if he had any weapons, which Tsui denied, but Tsui 
was “nervous, didn’t make much eye contact, [and] kept scanning the room when 
he got down to the bottom of the stairs.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, L.24 – p.11, L.5, 
p.22, Ls.10-15.)  Officer Martinez also noted that, prior to entering the residence, 
they encountered a man sitting in a car outside Dickson’s house who said he was 
“waiting for a friend” who lived across the street.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.19, L.25 – 
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p.20, L.6.)  That individual also did not “want[ ] to make much eye contact” with 
the officers.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.20, Ls.10-12.)  Due to safety concerns, Officer 
Martinez told Tsui he was going to pat search him for weapons, and did so, but 
he did not remove anything from Tsui’s pockets.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.11, L.6 – 
p.12, L.14, p.23, L.19 – p.25, L.9.)  Based on the evidence presented, the district 
court concluded: 
 In this case, under the circumstances within which the 
officers entered the residence, under the way that the defendant 
presented to the officers and after the parolee came downstairs, I 
do find that there was reason to believe or to suspect that Mr. Tsui 
may have been armed and then a pat search was reasonable 
under those circumstances. 
 
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.33, L.20 – p.34, L.2.)   
 On appeal, Tsui first complains “it is not clear what ‘circumstances’ the 
district court is referring to with respect to the officers’ entry into Mr. Dixon’s 
residence” since there was no evidence of Dixon’s “criminal history” or evidence 
that his residence “was or had been a place of known criminal activity.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  Obviously the district court was not referring to Dixon’s 
“criminal history” or evidence of “criminal activity” at Dixon’s house in referencing 
the circumstances surrounding the officers’ entry into his home since no such 
evidence was presented; rather, the court was referring to the evidence actually 
presented, which included the individual the officers encountered outside Dixon’s 
house and the delay in Tsui coming downstairs after the officers entered the 
residence.  Tsui’s confusion on this point does not demonstrate error.   
 Tsui next notes the lack of any evidence that Tsui “had a bulge in his 
pocket that resembled a weapon, made any threatening or furtive movements, 
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appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or was unwilling to 
cooperate with the officers in any way,” which are factors that are relevant to 
whether there was reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed and 
dangerous.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  While Tsui is correct that there was no 
evidence of any of these factors, this combination of factors is not necessarily 
required in order to justify a frisk.  Although the Court in Bishop indicated the 
foregoing factors “influence whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position 
would conclude that a particular person was armed and dangerous,” it did not 
foreclose the consideration of other factors that could also influence a reasonable 
person’s assessment of the situation.  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 
1218; State v. Crooks, 150 Idaho 117, 121, 244 P.3d 261, 265 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(“Notably, the Bishop Court did not indicate that its list of factors to consider in 
determining the reasonableness of a belief that a suspect is armed and 
dangerous was exhaustive.”).  Ultimately, a frisk is constitutional so long as the 
officer can “demonstrate how the facts he or she relied on in conducting the frisk 
support the conclusion that the suspect posed a risk of danger.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).  In Tsui’s case, the district court focused on other relevant 
considerations, which included “the way [Tsui] presented to the officers” after 
Dixon had already come downstairs.  Tsui initially had his hands in his sweatshirt 
pocket, was nervous, and was “scanning” the room.  Based on these facts, the 
district court found it was reasonable for Officer Martinez to conclude that Tsui 
posed a risk of danger and, as such, a frisk was warranted.     
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Tsui’s comparison of the facts of his case to State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 
655, 152 P.3d 16 (2007), is not persuasive.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-9.)  In 
Henage, the Court found the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to 
frisk because the officer testified he knew Henage from prior encounters, had 
always known him to be “polite” and “cooperative,” which was consistent with 
Henage’s behavior during the particular encounter at issue, and that, although 
Henage told the officer he had a knife on him, the officer returned the knife, 
which was a Leatherman, to Henage after being made aware of its presence.  Id. 
at 661-662, 22-23.  Unlike in Henage, Officer Martinez had no such experience 
with Tsui, and the circumstances surrounding the encounter, which included 
being inside the home of a felony parolee where others were present, were 
reasonably perceived as posing a risk of danger.   
Tsui has failed to establish any error in the denial of his suppression 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Tsui’s conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine. 
 DATED this 14th day of July 14, 2016. 
             
       
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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